I recently came across an article with the provocative title “Yes, There Is A Self” by David Mc Donald. To get the full context, I recommend reading David’s original essay and the discussion in the comments:
This response isn’t meant to bash David; from what I’ve seen, his work in the self-help community earned him a sizable loyal following, and he’s collaborated with HealthyGamerGG, an organization that helped me immensely when first getting into Psychology. (Check out their channel if you have the time.)
I want to address my fundamental disagreement with the premise of his article: that there’s a self. But first, a couple of things I have to preface before starting; my rebuke is based solely on the early Buddhist texts, the Pali Canon’s Suttas. Not because I’m trying to move goal posts, but simply because it’s the only source I accept.
‘But we can’t ever know what the Buddha actually said.’ - True, however, my focus isn’t on historical validity, just the contents of the text.
In respect to Tibetan Buddhism, Advaita, or “YouTube gurus”, I really don’t have much to comment on in that department. If Mc Donald wants to dunk on internet douchebags, I’m completely with him there. But that doesn’t make every Buddhist adjacent thinker a pseudointellectual peddling nonsense like ‘everything is fake, and you can see that if you meditate enough.’
So with that out of the way, let’s get to the real meat of the discussion:
*Note that I will use the acronym “SN” when referring to text from the Samyutta Nikaya
De-Mystifying Non-Self
Not to start Dharmasplaining even before introducing my point, but an explanation of non-self can’t suffice without mentioning the five aggregates (Pañcakkhandhā), the ontological bedrock of Buddhist philosophy:
Form aggregate (Rūpa-khandha): Internal and external materiality
Feeling aggregate (Vedanā-khandha): Resultant sensation from contact
Perception aggregate (Saññā-khandha): Resultant apprehension from contact
Volitional formations (Saṅkhāra-khandha): Mental formations and intentions
Consciousness aggregate (Viññāṇa-khandha): Cognition
Our experience is wholly comprised within these aggregates; nothing can pertain beyond. The non-self tenet is held regarding them. It’s important to note that the claim isn’t ‘there is no self,’ but that nothing in the world can be identified as self or mine (SN 44.10).
‘Isn’t this question begging?’ Then name an aggregate apart from the above. To do so would involve an implicit assumption that there is something outside of them.
“Does bare attention reveal the antecedent truth of no-self? Or does it change
experience, so that experience comes to conform to the no-self norm, by leading us to disidentify with the mind so that it’s no longer experienced as
“I” or “me” or “mine”? Is bare attention more like a light that reveals things
or a mould that shapes them” - Evan Thompson.
This quote, used by David in the introduction, underlines the key misunderstanding: That non-self nature is some sort of super mystical truth that we uncover only after meditating hard enough. On the contrary, it’s discernible with some pretty basic logic.
Post publish edit: this is in reference to mundane diserability; full understanding of non-self is a supermundane grasping only achievable by noble disciples.
The best way to illustrate non-self is with the three marks of existence: impermanence (Anicca), suffering (Anattā), and non-self (Dukkha).
‘But impermanence and suffering are subjective.’ This reasoning involves levels of reductionism and mental gymnastics bordering on nihilism. While I concede that on a mundane level, these concepts carry some variance (cessation of thoughts can fit some people’s classification of impermanence, while others accept only more substantial cases, such as physical death; some enjoy loud concerts, others find them torturous), the Buddha outlines an overarching classification of both. Below are the definitions for impermanence and suffering, respectively:
“With the arising of nutriment there is the arising of form. With the cessation of nutriment there is the cessation of form…
“With the arising of contact there is the arising of feeling. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of feeling…
“With the arising of contact there is the arising of perception. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of perception…
“With the arising of contact there is the arising of volitional formations. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of volitional formations…
“With the arising of name-and-form there is the arising of consciousness. With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness.
SN 22.57
"Friend Sariputta, it is said, 'suffering, suffering.' What now is suffering? There are, friend, these three kinds of suffering: the suffering due to pain, the suffering due to formations, the suffering due to change. These are the three kinds of suffering."
SN 38.14
‘Don’t the marks of existence fall into circular reasoning?’ Not if you understand their linear application, as shown in the following quote:
“‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?’—‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’—‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’—‘Suffering, venerable sir.’—‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self'"?’”
SN 22.59
*This formula applies to the other aggregates
For something to constitute mine, I’d need to be able to exercise full control over it, nothing less. It’s a subjective judgement, but a perfectly valid one. Let’s play into this hypothetical of selfhood; For any person wishing for their welfare, what reason would I have to mold myself or my possessions in a way that involves impermanence or suffering? If I’m captain of my soul, my first enactment would be to eliminate all suffering and impermanence, and experience unending bliss.
There’s nothing conceptual about the truths that underpin the doctrine. Seeing the world’s empirical qualities of suffering and impermanence is, dare I say, ‘just so obvious.’ Is it an assumption to extrapolate these truths onto a doctrine of non-self? Most definitely. But that doesn’t uncover an inherent fallacy, as Mc Donald holds. We have to make assumptions about everything; I assume the keyboard I’m writing this on works, and I can look back at my screen and see my progress. It’s useful to think of the teaching as a wager; would we be better off assuming that, despite the world’s incessant mutability, there is a transcendent ‘self,’ or a far more grounded premise that our constantly changing experience holds no basis for the former?
"Bhikkhus, suppose there was a mountain river sweeping downwards, flowing into the distance with a swift current. If on either bank of the river kāsa grass or kusa grass were to grow, it would overhang it; if rushes, reeds, or trees were to grow, they would overhang it. If a man being carried along by the current should grasp the kāsa grass, it would break off and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster; if he should grasp the kusa grass, it would break off and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster; if he should grasp the rushes, reeds, or trees, they would break off and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster. "So too, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling . . . regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. That form of his disintegrates and he thereby meets with calamity and disaster.
SN 22.93
*The template applies to the other aggregates
The analogy shows how the former wager will always fail us due to the khandhas’ intrinsic qualities of Anicca and Dukkha. In other words, much like the riverbank’s foliage, the aggregates are fragile and unreliable; appropriating them ends only in sorrow and lament. And this doesn’t manifest just at the level of accepting viewpoints, but more implicitly through our actions. If I were to anguish at the spillage of water on my desk, it would be on account of taking the aggregates as mine.
The crux is that things simply aren’t in our control, whether we like it or not. For a destitute traveler scorched in the hot season at high noon, a mirage is the fantasy they’d want to believe (SN 22.93). The same sense is carried with a presumption of selfhood. Ultimately, it’s a manifestation of conceit; one that reaps endless pain and misery for those ensnared. To those trapped in the cycle of I-making and mine-making, it’s akin to a dog tied to a pillar, running and revolving around for eternity (SN 22.99).
The Self Is An Illusion
So yes, actually, the self is ‘some flimsy illusion.’ However, this realization doesn’t entail dissociation as David frames it. He’s rightfully concerned with the psychological consequences of faulty practice, however, the aim of early Buddhism couldn’t be further. Instead, the intention is to develop dispassion.
“So impermanent are formations, bhikkhus, so unstable, so unreliable. It is enough, bhikkhus, to experience revulsion towards all formations, enough to become dispassionate towards them, enough to be liberated from them."
SN 15.20
The fruit of this revulsion and dispassion isn’t simply enlightenment, but to untangle yourself from the grip of conceit that afflicts you here and now. It’s quite an empowering message, teaching how to reclaim authority over life.
One of Mc Donald’s key arguments is based on this false equivalency that substance, coherence, and coherence over time are undeniable characteristics of a self. This is something Emilio covered in his comment to the original article, so I won’t go into too much depth here. While people’s definitions of selfhood vary, my stance is that this mundane application simply doesn’t suffice. Substance and coherence are themselves of a non-self nature, as they aren’t “permanent or independently existing,” as Emilio writes.
Another misconception is that a non-self doctrine necessitates the denial of a percipient, a faulty assumption based on a straw man holding that objects conventionally deemed as self require negation for the thesis to maintain reasonability. It’s one of the fundamental misjudgments that plagues proponents of self. The irony is that Mc Donald’s standard for selfhood is itself philosophically loaded with the assumption that a perceiver, substance, or coherence are intrinsic qualities of self.
David lists seventeen “obvious cases of suggestibility and hypnosis riddled with assumptions.” These truthfully don’t warrant thorough coverage, given that their basis lies more in the author’s fixation on non-duality, pure consciousness, and his no-percipient straw man, rather than any sort of engagement with the specific doctrine he intends to disprove. As to why non-duality doesn’t apply in an early Buddhist context, I’d recommend Bhikkhu Bodhi’s essay “Dhamma and Non-duality.” The other points brought up are red herrings, extending beyond the scope of the discussion.
Conclusion
“If you’re stuck here, don’t worry: you can get out. There’s no final plunge, no irreversible drop. You can turn back whenever you want— There is no such thing as ‘once you're on the path you're not getting off’ That’s not how experience-driven neuroplasticity works. You’re the captain of your own soul, your life, and your way of being.”
From Mc Donald’s original article
While I mostly agree with the conclusion, I’d like to point out some nuance here; what Mc Donald refers to as ‘once you're on the path you're not getting off’ is akin to a concept known as stream entry (Sotāpanna) in the Pali Canon. This is the first stage of enlightenment, and guarantees arahantship (enlightenment) within seven lives. At this stage, someone has already surmounted doubt of the teaching (vicikicchā), and therefore doesn’t need to question their insight. Think of it as an upward trajectory, not the ‘final plunge’ or ‘irreversible drop’ it’s made out to be. So it’s not that there isn’t a point of no return, but rather that it doesn’t apply to an audience that hasn’t completely abandoned the three fetters (tīṇi saṅyojanāni) of identity view (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), doubt (vicikicchā), and attachment to rites and rituals (sīlabbata-parāmāsa).
In short, the article fails to substantiate its claim: that there is a self. David’s critiques of a wider non-self doctrine through his limited understanding of a specific type of Buddhism make way for many straw man and red herring type fallacies. In response to feedback regarding his stance, it seems Mc Donald backpedals to a more nuanced position of targeting only ‘non dual teachers mostly’, which, if it is the case, isn’t made clear from the text’s thesis of categorical denial of non-self.
While David’s disillusionment with spirituality and meditation is perfectly understandable, his insistence on a topic wider than the extent of his gripe comes off as contrived. I’m entirely open to criticism of non-dual teachings, and there’s undeniably plenty of danger associated with misleading and faulty spiritual/meditative practices. But when it comes in the form of a refutation of non-self, you’re playing in a completely different arena.
If substance or coherence alone suffices as a self for David, that’s perfectly acceptable as a personal judgement. But for the reasons I laid out, I fundamentally disagree with this stance.
Mc Donald is getting at something important regarding the very real consequences of some spiritual teachings and practices. Dissociation and depersonalization are actual psychological problems that many people struggle with, along with the many accounts of negative effects after intense meditation, not to mention other potential conditions, such as depression etc. However, arguing against non-self based on the doctrine’s supposed potential for psychological damage is an appeal to consequences fallacy. Perhaps this article would have been better served as a cautionary warning for people getting into spirituality, rather than a refutation of non-self.
I wrote this text not just as a response to David, but also as a general response to others holding similar notions. Once again, my intention isn’t to bash or attack anyone, but simply to refute a theory I disagree with. All best wishes to Mc Donald and anyone who might come across this piece.
This being my first article, I’d genuinely like to thank anyone who stumbled upon this and made it to the end. Consider subscribing if you’re interested in this type of discourse, as I plan to publish more. Feel free to continue the discussion in the comments, whether you agree or disagree with my take. I’d especially love to hear from proponents of non-duality respond to Mc Donald’s critiques.
Just realized that it’s 2 PM on June 1st as I’m wrapping this up, so happy Pride month :)
Here’s a fundraiser if you’d like to help earthquake survivors in Myanmar (Thanks to Bernat Font for the inspiration):
(Thank you for this reply. I will make some brief comments here and I may reply in more depth in a post. Although my post was mainly directed at the form of no self thougth by radical online non duality teachers (Pretty low hanging fruit, I know) I still have major issues with what your arguing for as well. I still think its riddled with pre assumed axiomatic assumptions that allow for no self to sound plausable.
Firstly, a brief point from a cognitive science perspective. The ancient Buddhist taxonomy of the things like the six sense doors and the five aggregates are thoroughly inadequate. It artificially dichotomizes the senses, and so can’t handle synaesthesia and complex forms of cross-modal integration. It doesn’t properly describe interoception, proprioception, and kinaesthesia. It also doesn’t distinguish between all the varieties of mental processes (mental attention, working memory, metacognition, etc.) Its an ancient way of artificially breaking up the mind, and its pre assumed. You are going to have to first of all defend the validity of the 6 sense doors and aggregates. To me, they are outdated assumptions that don’t and cant account for the above. pre-scientific taxonomies like this have a lot of issues. But, science alone cannot answer this question, I will admit. That’s where we will have to resort to philosophical lines of reasoning.
If I take a philosophical angle (Aristotle, Aquinas) I still hold that Mental states are attributes, and attributes cannot be identified or individuated except by reference to a substance in which they inhere. (And this does not contradict cognitive science, nore is it at odds with it) There is no way to identify the relevant causal relations between mental states without reference to a self. The self is real and irreducible which entails that it is a substance that persists through changes of its attributes and cannot coherently be identified with the collection of attributes themselves. Edward Feser defined it as “The substance—a unified, immaterial, rational soul—which underlies, unifies, and endures through the various psychological states, bodily changes, and experiences of a human person”
Permanence and independence are also not the essential criteria for selfhood. what defines the self is that it is a metaphysical subject, the locus in which mental events inhere, and which gives them unity and ownership. Even if coherence and substance are impermanent, they are still features that require grounding. To deny their grounding is not to refute the self but to destroy the intelligibility of experience itself:
Non-self doesn’t deny a “percipient”??? But if that’s the case then you must answer: what is the percipient? What is this “not-self” that nonetheless perceives? Its like youre trying to keep music while denying vibration. I see this as absolutely insurmountable and impossible to get around, so I am looking forward to your response.
If no experience can yield a self, then the very act of evaluating experience for selfhood becomes unintelligible. Who is the evaluator? Who is performing this epistemic abstention? I have found all answers to this question form a Buddhist perspective to be circular, or they in some way smuggle in a self.
From an Advaita perspective, If you’re analyzing and negating each aggregate in turn, you're relying on a continuity of awareness across time. But that continuity isn’t in the aggregates, it’s what binds them. You can't deconstruct a rope by inspecting and discarding its threads while still holding the rope.
The very act of disidentification presupposes a unified subject of experience. Its also a textbook category error, confusing the attributes of a thing with the thing itself(As mentioned above). As Edward Feser argued in his book on the nature of persons “changeability in attributes doesn’t imply the nonexistence of the subject that possesses them.
Your argument also assumes that selfhood would require omnipotent control. But no serious philosophical tradition—not Aristotelian, not Cartesian, not even most forms of Vedānta, claims that the self, as such, entails sovereign power over all aspects of its condition. Agency doesn’t require omnipotence; it requires unity, intention, and continuity. And that is a pretty deep conversation in and of itself, control and free will. It would end up being an entire discussion in itself.
“Attributes cannot be identified or individuated apart from the substance in which they inhere… identifying the bundles by reference to the individual mental states, and identifying the individual mental states by reference to the bundles of which they are members, would only yield a viciously circular “ explanation
That’s something to chew on for now 😊